Vacek on AI control

Vacek, D. (2023). Two remarks on the new AI control problem. AI and Ethics, 1-6. Available at:

Abstract: This paper examines the new AI control problem and the control dilemma recently formulated by Sven Nyholm. It puts forth two remarks that may be of help in (dis)solving the problem and resolving the corresponding dilemma. First, the paper suggests that the idea of complete control should be replaced with the notion of considerable control. Second, the paper casts doubt on what seems to be assumed by the dilemma, namely that control over another human being is, by default, morally problematic. I suggest that there are some contexts (namely, relations of vicarious responsibility and vicarious agency) where having considerable control over another human being is morally unproblematic, if not desirable. If this is the case, control over advanced humanoid robots could well be another instance of morally unproblematic control. Alternatively, what makes it a problematic instance remains an open question insofar as the representation of control over another human being is not sufficient for wrongness, since even considerable control over another human being is often not wrong.

Mesarčík, Slosiarová, Podroužek, and Bieliková on the regulation of generative artificial intelligence

Stance on the regulation of Generative Artificial Intelligence: Position on the selected aspects of regulation of general purpose AIs, foundation models and generative AI systems as proposed by the positions of the European Parliament and Council towards AI Act. See:

Podroužek on AI in the healthcare (media, 18 July 2023, in Slovak)

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